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1Multicultural Lawyering: Teaching Psychology to Develop Cultural Self-Awareness
Carwina Weng
Much of the current literature in multicultural lawyering focuses 
on learning substantive information about clients who are culturally 
different from the lawyer, such as how the client’s culture perceives eye 
contact or reacts to science-based world views.  This article notes that 
such a focus sidesteps the human reality that every person reacts to people 
who are different from him- or herself unconsciously in ways that may be 
culturally insensitive and discriminatory and that this human reaction 
occurs despite awareness of the general values, attitudes, and beliefs of 
the client’s culture.  It therefore suggests that multicultural lawyering 
training should begin with the lawyer’s self-analysis of his/her culture and 
its influences on the lawyer.   Such cultural self-awareness is considered 
in social science to be the key to multicultural competence, because 
awareness of one’s own culture allows more accurate understanding of 
cultural forces that affect the lawyer, the client, and the interaction of the 
two.  Specifically, the article offers a framework for learning cultural self-
awareness, starting with the teaching of cognitive and social psychology.  
This psychology would include an understanding of the unconscious 
mechanisms by which every person categorizes others and the use every 
person makes of these categories as s/he encounters culturally different 
persons.  It also provides real-life examples of how unconscious 
categorization affects behavior and how cultural self-awareness can 
enable more accurate, client-centered lawyering.
The fiftieth anniversary of the decision in Brown v. Board of Education1 and the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in the Michigan affirmative action cases2 have reenergized 
our national conversation regarding diversity. The Court’s endorsement of diversity in 
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1
 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
2
 White applicants who were denied admission to the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor’s undergraduate 
college and law school sued the university to challenge its affirmative action programs.  The undergraduate 
college used a point-allocation system, by which racial and ethnic minorities could receive up to 20 points 
for their racial/ethnic membership.  Points also were awarded for academic excellence, as demonstrated by 
GPA and test scores, athletic prowess, other talents, geographic diversity, etc.  An applicant typically 
needed 100 out of 150 points to be admitted right away.  The Supreme Court struck down this system as 
approximating a quota because the allocation of points did not allow sufficiently individualized review of 
each applicant.  Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 266 (2003).  The law school utilized a more 
individualized, holistic  admissions process, with the goal of achieving a “critical mass” of racial and ethnic 
minority members.  This process was upheld as constitutional.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 
(2003).
2Grutter v. Bollinger as “essential” to quality education, preparation for work in a global 
economy, cross-racial understanding, and decreasing prejudice3 was unexpected.4 A core 
premise of this endorsement is that “the skills needed in today’s increasingly global 
marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, 
ideas, and viewpoints.”5 This article considers the implications of the Court’s rationale 
as well as the rationale that is missing – the ongoing role affirmative action plays in 
redressing past and current discrimination6 – for training law students to practice with 
multicultural competence.  
My concerns with the Court’s emphasis on exposure to diverse students are 
twofold.  First, this emphasis ignores ongoing discrimination faced by members of 
nondominant cultures.  Now, diversity is acceptable because it helps white students 
compete in a global marketplace rather than because it helps to redress past and ongoing 
discrimination.7  Second, by ignoring ongoing discrimination, the Court’s emphasis on 
exposure suggests that structural diversity 8 alone could paper over the lasting effects of a 
3 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324-25.
4
 Lyle Denniston, High Court's Course Debated after Rulings Two Key Civil Rights Decisions Mark Shift
from Conservatism, BOSTON GLOBE, June 30, 2003, at A3; Jan Crawford Greenberg, High Court Rulings
Stun the Right Decisions on Race, Gays Show Justices’ Knack for Surprise, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, 
FL, Broward Co. Metro ed.), June 29, 2003, at 4A; Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Overview; In a 
Momentous Term, Justices Remake the Law, and the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2003, at A1; Tony Mauro, 
It's a Mad, Mad, Mad, Mad Court/Justices Upended Expectations in 2002-2003 Term, TEXAS LAWYER, 
July 7, 2003, at 12; and Martin Michaelson, The Court's Pronouncements Are More Dramatic and Subtle 
Than the Headlines,  CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., July 18, 2003, at Review 11.
5 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 321 (citations omitted).  Justice O’Connor relied on the briefs of the respondent law 
school and numerous amici from the business world and the military in reaching her conclusion. Id. at 334.
6
 As Justice Ginsburg noted, “In the wake of ‘a system of racial caste only recently ended, large disparities 
endure.  Unemployment, poverty, and access to health care vary disproportionately by race.  
Neighborhoods and schools remain racially divided.”  Gratz, 539 U.S. at 300 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
7
 For a discussion of the rise of market-based rationales for diversity in the legal profession and their effect 
on social justice and equal opportunity, see generally David B. Wilkins, From “Separate is Inherently 
Unequal” to “Diversity is Good for Business:”  The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the 
Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548 (2004).
8
 Structural diversity refers to the “levels of diversity” in an institution.  Brief for the American 
Psychological Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents,  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 
(2003) (No. 02-241), available at 2002 US Briefs 241, 17 (2003) (hereinafter APA amicus brief); Expert 
3history of prejudice and discrimination and create culturally competent workers within 
one generation.9 Such a suggestion minimizes the need for institutional support for
diversity10 and acknowledgement that discrimination continues.  Without such support, 
“[a] campus could be full of minority students yet still have a segregated environment 
without meaningful interactions between different racial and ethnic groups.”11  Indeed, 
students from culturally diverse backgrounds might face pressure to contribute diverse 
cultures, ideas, and viewpoints to the classroom experience12 and to be diverse in a way 
that is “global,” or international, rather than domestically American.13 In short, an 
emphasis on exposure alone maintains the perception of diverse students as “the other” 
and absolves students in the dominant American culture from understanding their own 
Report of Patricia Gurin, Theoretical Foundations at 4, Gratz v. Bollinger,  122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. 
Mich. 2000) (No. 97-75321) and  Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 97-
75928), available at http://www.umich.edu/~urel/admissions/legal/expert/gurintoc.html (last visited July 
29, 2004) (hereinafter Gurin report).
9 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342.  Justice O’Connor evinced the hope that, given the progress in minority 
enrollments since the decision in Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), “25 years 
from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”  
Id. at 343.  Justice Thomas went farther still, opining “While I agree that in 25 years the practices of the 
law school will be illegal, they are, for the reasons I have given, illegal now.”  Id. at 362 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).
10
 Full institutional support for cultural competence would allow the institution itself to become culturally 
competent.  For this development to occur, the institution would need to value diversity, engage in self-
assessment of its own culture, develop means to accommodate difference, integrate cultural competence 
into the institution, and adapt to diversity.  Carolyn Copps Hartley & Carrie J. Petrucci, Justice, Ethics, and 
Interdisciplinary Teaching and Practice:  Practicing Culturally Competent Therapeutic Jurisprudence:  A 
Collaboration between Social Work and Law, 14. WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133, 171-73 (2004).
11
 APA amicus brief, supra note 8, at 18.  The emphasis in the Michigan cases was, of course, on racial and 
ethnic diversity.  The arguments advanced in these cases as well as in this article apply as well to a broader 
definition of diversity.  
12
 Perry Bacon, Jr., How Much Diversity Do You Want from Me? TIME, July 7, 2003, at 108.  Bacon, an 
African-American journalist at TIME, comments, “O’Connor’s diversity rationale doesn’t just pressure 
colleges to admit more minority students.  It gives me and other underrepresented minority students an 
added burden:  delivering diversity.  It creates expectations that I have a uniquely black viewpoint to
contribute and that part of my responsibility as a student or worker is to do that.”  Id.  In essence, a new 
stereotype is being created, and people of color may feel “stereotype vulnerability,” or pressure to behave 
in conformity with the stereotype.  Marc R. Poirier, Gender Stereotypes at Work, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1073, 
1098-99 (1999).
13
 The emphasis on multicultural competence to function in a global marketplace suggests that such 
competence is necessary to interact with non-Americans, and this suggestion in turn implies that, 
domestically, all Americans, regardless of cultural background (racial, ethnic, sexual orientation, 
socioeconomic class, etc.) are sufficiently uniform as to cultural background and power that multicultural 
competence need not be developed as to them. 
4culture and the ways in which that culture – especially its legacy of discrimination –
affects their interactions with other individuals. 
The literature on developing multicultural competence, fortunately, does not 
adopt so simplistic a perspective.  Empirical studies in the social sciences support the 
need for educational initiatives specifically designed to teach multicultural competence14
in combination with meaningful exposure to multicultural interactions.15   Through these 
studies, consensus has arisen that multicultural competence begins with cultural self-
awareness.16 Cultural self-awareness is the key because it enables us to “recognize that 
as cultural beings, [we] may hold attitudes and beliefs that can detrimentally influence 
[our] perceptions of and interactions with individuals who are ethnically and racially 
different from [our]selves.”17
However, within the newer world of multicultural competence training for 
lawyers, “diversity” training for lawyers often replicates the fallacies of the Grutter
decision.  At training sessions I have attended, the most common response to why such 
training is important is that the clients are ethnically and racial different from the lawyers.
This response is not wrong, but it is superficial.  It leads attendees to clamor for concrete 
14
 For a comprehensive review and listing of such empirical studies, see Gurin Report, supra note 8, at 
Appendix B.  See also Cruz Reynoso & Cory Amron, Diversity in Legal Education:  A Broader View, A 
Deeper Commitment, J. LEGAL EDUC., 491, 503-5 (2002) (encouraging law schools to “foster pedagogical 
and curricular innovation” to promote diversity’s values).
15 See, e.g., APA amicus brief, supra note 8, at 12-15 and studies cited therein.
16 See, e.g., American Psychological Ass’n, Guidelines on Multicultural Education, Training, Research, 
Practice, and Organizational Change for Psychologists (August 2002), available at
http://www.apa.org/pi/multiculturalguidelines/formats.html (hereinafter APA Guidelines); Patricia 
Arredondo & G. Miguel Arciniega, Strategies and Techniques for Counselor Training Based on the 
Multicultural Counseling Competencies, J. MULTICULTURAL COUNSELING AND DEV. 263, 266 (2001); 
PAUL B. PEDERSEN, CULTURE-CENTERED COUNSELING INTERVENTIONS:  STRIVING FOR ACCURACY 203
(1997); DERALD W. SUE & DAVID SUE, COUNSELING THE CULTURALLY DIFFERENT:  THEORY AND
PRACTICE 17 (3d ed. 1999).
17
 APA Guidelines, supra note 16, at 17.  The APA places self-awareness as the first of its guidelines for 
multicultural counseling.  Note that the APA Guidelines deal solely with racial and ethnic cultural 
competence.  Its strictures, however, also apply to other kinds of cultural diversity, which are included in 
this article.
5skills18 (how do I interview a client who is culturally different from me?) and trainers to 
omit deeper discussions of multicultural competence, including the connections between 
culture, behavior, and discrimination.  As a result, much training encourages attendees to 
take shortcuts that reinforce the perception of the client as “the other,” and to avoid 
developing cultural self-awareness.19
The partial solution I offer today is to teach law students cognitive and social 
psychology relevant to multicultural lawyering.  With such an understanding, law 
students and we clinicians might learn how people absorb information from the cultures 
we inhabit and encounter to form social constructions20 about people, how these 
constructions might include stereotypes about people different from ourselves, and how 
18 See generally Susan Bryant, The Five Habits:  Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyering, 8 
CLINICAL L. REV. 33 (2001) (espousing the five habits as “a process to avoid cultural blinders and recover 
from cultural blunders”); Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling across Cultures:  Heuristics and 
Biases, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 373 (2002) (offering “concrete ways to change behavior, especially drawing on 
other field’s exploration of cross-cultural interaction”).  These authors do not ignore the need for cultural 
self-awareness.  Bryant, supra note 18, at 48-63; Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: the 
Missing Element in Client-Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345, 374-91 (1997), 
Tremblay, supra note 18, at 385-87, 407-16.  Indeed, Tremblay recommends that lawyers develop some 
familiarity with cultural identity development theory, which generally recognizes stages in progression of 
cultural consciousness.  Id. at 414-15.  However, it is easy to leapfrog over cultural self-awareness, 
especially as members of a dominant culture are often unaware that such a culture exists.  See infra pp. 37-
38.
Other authors have written expressly about the relevant psychology but as a means of 
understanding the actions of others, not the attorney herself.  See, e.g., STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K. 
NEUMANN, JR., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS 130-32 (2ND ed. 2003) (understanding how clients create 
narratives and how courts and juries perceive them), Poirier, supra note 12, at 1086-116 (accounting for 
ongoing gender discrimination in employment), Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:  
A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 
1186-217 (1995) (same), Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Voices in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
1261, 1276-308 (2000) (understanding dynamics of juries that include women and racial/ethnic minorities).  
One exception is ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND
NEGOTIATING:  SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION 19-57 (1990), which includes a chapter on 
“Helping Theories” designed to assist students to understand themselves as helpers.  This chapter does not 
explicitly address multicultural lawyering. 
19 See infra pp.  18-26.
20
 Social constructions are “cultural characterizations or popular images individuals hold that serve to 
define certain groups in society.”  Constructions involving race or ethnicity in particular are strongly held, 
and the more strongly held a construction is, “the more resistant are the attitudes associated with [it] to new 
and contradictory information.”  Hartley & Petrucci, supra note 10, at 163-64.  
6these constructions might lead to (un)conscious discrimination toward out-group
members, even in individuals who consider themselves to hold progressive attitudes on 
diversity.21 We might also learn that the risk of errors in perception and judgment is even 
greater in professional settings such as law school clinical programs because of the power 
differential between the client (often a poor person of color) and the attorney, who often
has access to more privileges as, for example, a member of the dominant culture or of a 
higher socioeconomic status.22 From this base, we might better appreciate the importance 
of cultural self-awareness, especially the examination of the attitudes, beliefs, and 
21 Given the decrease in conscious discrimination in American society, the unconscious privilege that 
members of the dominant American culture, usually whites, typically enjoy can increase resistance to 
examining issues of discrimination because exploration of ethnocentrism “challenges the common and 
accepted images and messages members of the majority culture have received since childhood.”  Id. at 137-
38.  Yet empirical studies that measure implicit associations among racial groups and evaluative attributes 
(for example, pleasant and unpleasant words) suggest that unconscious and subtle forms of prejudice and 
discrimination still exist.  These implicit association tests (IAT) ask participants to classify images 
representing racial groups and evaluative attributes such as pleasant or unpleasant words using two 
designated keys.  Participants typically perform the classification more quickly when pleasant attributes 
share the same key as White images and when unpleasant attributes share the same key as Black images.  
This outcome occurs even among participants who are aware of the purpose of the test – to measure racist 
attitudes – and who are self-avowedly low-prejudiced.  Nilanjana Dasgupta et al., Automatic Preference for 
White Americans:  Eliminating the Familiarity Explanation, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 316, 
316-18 (2000) (citations omitted).  To take the IAT yourself, visit https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/.
22 See BEA WEHRLY , PATHWAYS TO MULTICULTURAL COUNSELING COMPETENCE:  A DEVELOPMENTAL
JOURNEY 171 (1995) (advising psychotherapists to address cultural self-awareness, including racism, 
because of the power counselors have over their client’s lives).  Power is an important element of 
discriminatory behavior because the person with power has the ability to control the person with less power 
even through unspoken differences in role, expertise, and cultural dynamics.  Id. at 167-68 (citations 
omitted).  Even when the student attorney is a member of, for example, a racial or ethnic minority, she 
acquires aspects of power vis à vis her client due to her role as the professional with specialized knowledge 
and skills in the relationship.  Cf. Michael Tlanusta Garrett et al., Multicultural SuperVISION:  A Paradigm 
of Cultural Responsiveness for Supervisors, J. MULTICULTURAL COUNSELING AND DEV., 147, 148 (2001) 
(noting that Native American counselor in supervisory role acts symbolically in dominant position vis à vis 
White supervisee).  How a client reacts to the student of color wielding actual or perceived power also will 
affect their relationship.  For example, the client might request direction from a student lawyer of the same 
cultural group, based on an expectation that the student lawyer is better able to navigate and to understand 
the client’s culture and the dominant one.  Conversely, the client might resent the student lawyer’s position 
because the student’s age or gender might otherwise preclude the student from holding that position.  See
ED NEUKRUG, THE WORLD OF THE COUNSELOR:  AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COUNSELING PROFESSION 354 
(1999).
7knowledge that create and reinforce social constructions that can unconsciously 
perpetuate discrimination. 23
This article proposes a framework in which to teach law students to develop self 
awareness, as a first step toward developing multicultural lawyering competence.  The 
framework operates as both a conceptual underpinning and as a means to lawyer with 
multicultural competence, but the article itself focuses on concepts over practice.  The 
article first reviews the development of client-centered lawyering and the recognition that 
dominant models of lawyering may unintentionally discriminate against indigent clients 
by labeling behaviors common to them as difficult and atypical.  Part two considers the 
development of more inclusive models of lawyering based on developments in 
psychotherapy and social work education.  Part three describes cognitive and social 
psychology relevant to multicultural lawyering.  Finally, Part four uses the lessons of this 
psychology to develop a framework for teaching students to develop cultural self-
awareness.  
I.  From Client-Centered to Multicultural Lawyering.
Lawyers are professionals because they are trained in an area that requires 
intellectual skill and specialized knowledge.  This training creates a power imbalance in 
the lawyer-client relationship:  the client supposedly goes to the lawyer for assistance 
because the lawyer has expertise the client lacks.24  Thus, in a traditional model of 
23
 Jacobs, supra note 18, at 391 (active listening, empathy are not sufficient to address cross-cultural issues; 
rather, lawyers need to understand why race-linked issues arise).  See infra pp. 28-34.
24
 Bastress & Harbaugh, supra note 18, at 283 (reminding students that the lawyer-client relationship 
“necessarily renders the client susceptible to manipulation by the lawyer” due to the lawyer’s control of the 
structure, agenda, and knowledge of the law).  Bastress and Harbaugh warn that  “domination and 
manipulation can only be avoided by persistent and conscientious self-control by the more powerful party.”  
Id.
8lawyering, the lawyer controls:  she is the one who knows the law and uses this 
knowledge to make predictions about the best legal outcomes and to set legal strategy.25
But the traditional model of lawyering is in many respects unsatisfactory.  
Crafting a good solution to a client’s problem could require familiarity with more than 
just the relevant legal facts; indeed, familiarity with more facts about the client’s situation 
could determine whether the lawyer even is thinking about the right legal claim.  Clients 
too might be dissatisfied with directive lawyering:  humanized lawyering accords them 
more respect and allows them greater control over the process.26  So, client-centered 
models of lawyering have developed.  The first model, promulgated by Binder and 
Price,27 (hereinafter the Binder-Price model) recognizes that the client has superior 
knowledge about her values, goals and situation, which will enable her to better choose a 
satisfactory resolution.28  Thus, client-centered lawyering attempts to shift the power 
imbalance by engaging the client as a participant in the lawyering process.29
However, the original formulation of client-centered lawyering was often inapt, at 
least as applied to clients many students encounter in clinical and legal services practice.  
Critics noted that the Binder-Price model conceptualized the client as a copy of the 
lawyer, minus the legal know-how.  This copy shared the lawyer’s socioeconomic status, 
perspective, organizational modes, etc. – for example, related his situation in clear, 
chronological order – and thus was ready, willing, and able to participate in the lawyering 
25
 DAVID A. BINDER et al., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 4 (2nd ed 2004) 
(hereinafter Lawyers as Counselors).  
26 Id. at 4-8.
27
 DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED 
APPROACH (1977).  
28 Lawyers as Counselors, supra note 25, at 5; Krieger & Neuman, supra note 18, at 22.
29 Lawyers as Counselors, supra note 25, at 8; Krieger & Neuman, supra note 18,  at 22-23.
9model promulgated by Binder and Price.30  Other clients, who might ramble, evince 
reluctance to discuss certain topics or to commence an interview, lie, or display anger or 
hostility were, in the Binder-Price parlance, “difficult” and “atypical.”31
The early Binder-Price model does offer some explanation as to why clients might 
be “difficult,” but the reasons do not take into account culture, whether based on race, 
socioeconomic status, or other factors, except age.32  The model thus ignores the fact that 
culture and other power and privilege differences also affect the client’s participation in 
the lawyering relationship.33   I recall, for example, a woman client who told me on our 
way to renew her restraining order that I could not understand her situation as a homeless 
survivor of domestic violence, who bounced from shelter to shelter with a small bag of 
clothes, because I have a loving husband and drove a new car.  Her statement forced me 
to consider what motivated the perception, and I realized that she equated me with the 
other privileged and powerful service providers in her life, who were investigating and 
seemingly judging her life and behavior.  I therefore adjusted my lawyering by 
acknowledging explicitly the class and personal differences between us, reminding her 
repeatedly that she had the authority to set the goals and direction for her case, and asking 
her more about her life with her husband, both the good and the bad, and her interests and 
concerns.  By making these adjustments, I gave the client room to reveal her goals, 
30
 Jacobs, supra note 18, at 349-53; Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client within Legal Education, 45 
STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1742-48 (1993).
31 Lawyers as Counselors, supra note 25, at 247-68.  
32
 The current edition of LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS does address issues of multicultural counseling 
explicitly.  See, e.g., Lawyers as Counselors, supra note 25, at 32-40.  It also intersperses cultural issues 
throughout the book by, for example, using ethnic names in hypotheticals (p. 13, 140, 323 and throughout) 
and acknowledging that cultural values might affect participation in decision making (p. 10).
33
 Shalleck, supra  note 30, at 1742-48.  By contrast, social work education emphasizes that students be 
aware of how their clients’ history of discrimination affects them in their interactions with the social 
worker as well as with groups and organizations.  Social work education, therefore, recognizes that, “to 
interact effectively with clients, particularly in a multicultural context, the client perspective must also be 
acknowledged, whether it is supported by research or not.”  Hartley & Petrucci, supra note 10, at 144.
10
interests, and concerns to me, and she confided that she had been maintaining the 
restraining order only because the Department of Social Services wanted her to do so.  In 
the comfort of our improved relationship, the client vacated the restraining order, with me 
at her side in support.34
In “Constructions of the Client within Legal Education,” Anne Shalleck points out 
that this undifferentiated model of client-centered lawyering in fact maintains  the lawyer 
as the dominant player.  She notes that the model favors a chronological narrative over 
other forms of storytelling, depends on the lawyer to determine the importance of both 
legal and nonlegal concerns, assumes a standardized client, and ignores power 
imbalances.35 Thus, the Binder-Price model “uses the lawyer-client relationship to 
construct the interests and motivations of clients through criteria the law controls.”36
Concerns about a “one-size-fits-all” training model arose among mental health 
professionals before they arose among law clinicians.37  Derald and David Sue warned 
that an “ethnocentric” model of counseling teaches students to practice in a way that can 
harm their clients.38  The model views the experiences of clients of color “from the 
‘White, European-American perspective’ . . . . [and] the focus tends to be on their 
pathological lifestyles and/or a maintenance of false stereotypes.”39  For example, a 
34
 A typical reaction to an anecdote like this is that I did what a good lawyer ought to do anyway.  My 
response is, yes, that’s correct.  After all, in my view, multicultural lawyering is good lawyering.  The 
difference is being explicit that culture matters so that a lawyer might clear up some of the assumptions 
occurring in both directions and make adjustments sooner, more readily, and more appropriately.
35
 Shalleck, supra note 30, at 1742-48.
36 Id. at 1747.
37
 Sue & Sue, supra note 16, at 11-12, discussing studies dating from the late 1970s in clinical and 
counseling psychology that indicated the failure of the profession to “meet the particular mental health 
needs” of people of color.
38 Id. at 12.  Sue and Sue explored, for example, cultural differences in support structures and decision 
making that could lead to misunderstandings in the therapy relationship.
39 Id. at 12.  Charles R. Ridley reminds us that “judgment [about diagnoses, treatment, referrals, etc.] is 
biased in the direction of preexisting stereotypes when the material to be judged is ambiguous or complex,” 
as it typically is in counseling and lawyering relationships.  He therefore warns counselors “to be alert, not 
11
counselor might view a patient’s reluctance to self-disclose as paranoia, when in fact that 
reluctance might be “a healthy reaction to racism” from the counselor.40   The counselor
might also “overshadow” a client’s job-related problems with personal ones, resulting in 
an underdiagnosis of psychopathology.41  Thus, mental health professionals also clearly 
recognized that an ethnocentric model of practice, combined with a power imbalance in 
favor of the professional, creates a system that permits replication of societal 
discrimination.42
Small wonder, then, that Michelle Jacobs should find the Binder-Price client-
centered model t roubling when applied to the primary consumer at her clinic, namely 
poor, black clients.43  Jacobs reminds us that clients labeled difficult by textbooks 
espousing client-centered lawyering might be resisting the lawyer’s invitation to 
participate in the lawyering process.44 Rather than dismiss the client as difficult, lawyers 
need to ask ourselves why the client might be resisting our invitation.  Might the client’s 
response be a reaction to behavior by the lawyer who fails to recognize “the real client in 
only to biases in judgment, but also to their personal biases as judges.”  CHARLES R. RIDLEY, OVERCOMING
UNINTENTIONAL RACISM IN COUNSELING AND THERAPY:  A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO INTENTIONAL
INTERVENTION  54-55 (1995).  
40 Id. at 62-65.  Ridley describes “cultural paranoia” as “a healthy reaction to racism.  The minority client 
who fears the White counselor and avoids self-disclosure fits this category.”   By contrast, “functional 
paranoia” is “an unhealthy psychological condition.  Minority clients who have a pervasive suspicion fit 
this category.  They would not disclose to any counselor regardless of race.”  Id. at 63.
41 Id. at 59.  Diagnostic overshadowing is defined as “the tendency of counselors to use one diagnosis to 
obscure or minimize the importance of another diagnosis.  In such cases, counselors underdiagnose 
psychopathology and minimize the client’s need for treatment.”  Ridley provides the example of a Native 
American college sophomore at a predominantly White university who seeks counseling  at a time when 
she is having problems selecting a major.  The counselor chooses to focus on the student’s efforts to adjust 
to the university rather than on the student’s need to select a major.  In so doing, the counselor may 
overlook concerns about, for example, choosing not to major in Native American studies, uncertainty about 
sciences versus humanities, or more specific concerns related to a major.  Id.
42
 Wehrly, supra note 22, at 167-68 (recognizes that power imbalance in therapeutic relationship and 
cultural dynamics gives counselor power to perpetuate oppression)
43
 Jacobs, supra note 18, at 352-53 (model creates an “essentialist” client, i.e., a standardized one that does 
not take into account people at the bottom of social hierarchy)
44 Id. at 355-61 (critiquing client behaviors considered to be problematic through a racial culture lens)
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her full context – culturally, politically and economically?”45  Or based on the client’s 
perception of a lawyer who is culturally different from her?
In the legal arena, as Jacobs warned, attorneys who learn an ethnocentric model 
may be ill-equipped to perceive and understand different values and world views 
presented by their clients.  These blinders – often unconscious and unintentional – can 
result in a lawyer’s misperception of culturally-based behaviors by her client or of her 
client’s reactions to the lawyer’s own culturally-based behaviors.  They can affect the 
lawyer’s ability to build trust and, therefore, the information the client chooses to share.46
They also can determine how the lawyer frames the client’s legal problem and directs the 
strategy.47 We thus end up with lawyers trained to consider clients who do not fit the 
model to be at best difficult and at worst pathological.48
Consider the following situation:  a white student whom I supervised was 
representing an African American client in a public housing eviction proceeding for 
nonpayment of rent.  The client had told the intake worker that the rent claimed due was 
not owed because the housing authority had failed to grant her a legally mandated, 12-
month freeze on rent once she stopped receiving public assistance benefits and began 
working.  We accepted her case for intake.  Later, the client told the student that, in fact,
she owed about an additional year’s worth of rent because she had not paid the rent that 
was based on her public assistance income.  The student was dumbfounded at the client’s 
45 Id. at 352-53, 355.  Charles Ridley points out that, “Many counselors are ineffective with minority clients 
because they fail to see the ‘big picture.’  They overlook societal factors that influence the behavior and 
adjustment of these clients.”  He therefore recommends that counselors learn of external pressures their 
clients encounter, such as racism and economic and educational disadvantages.  Ridley, supra note 39, at 
12.  In addition, the counselor can ask the client (without judging him) the reason for the behavior so that 
the counselor can understand the client’s response and attempt different means to facilitate client 
participation.
46
 Anthony A. Alfieri, Stances, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1233, 1249 (1992); Jacobs, supra note 18, at 389.
47
 Jacobs, supra note 18, at 380-81, 391.
48
 Sue & Sue, supra note 16, at 12.
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earlier fabrication and at the fact that the client had not paid rent when, technically, she 
had the income to do so.  The student continued the interview, asking questions about the 
rent that was due.49  The client told the student that she had made efforts to pay the rent 
but that money orders had been lost or stolen and she no longer had the money order 
receipts.  
After the interview, the student came to me to process the client’s revelations.  In 
our discussion, we learned that the student’s conception of a legal client was her mother, 
who was involved in a minor civil case at the time and whom the student could not 
conceive of lying to her lawyer or not paying a bill.  Through further discussion, we 
considered reasons for the client’s initial lie, including the possibility that the client had 
lied to obtain a scarce intake interview.  Somewhat comforted with this possibility, the 
student proceeded to fashion a theory and negotiation strategy for a low-amount, long 
payment plan based on the information the client had given.
Later, after the student had left the clinic and I was preparing for the court 
hearing, the client told me that she had not paid rent, not because she had lost the money 
orders, but because she was fed up with the paternalistic, racist, and often hostile attitude 
of her housing manager.  She was unwilling to negotiate with him but instructed me to 
offer a shorter, higher-level payment plan to the housing authority lawyer who had 
instructed the housing manger to implement the post-public assistance rent freeze.  She 
based this instruction on her willingness to work with a lawyer with whom she did not 
have a contentious history and on her desire to show her manager that she was a good and 
worthy tenant.  
49
 The student never asked the client why she had lied.  Few students and lawyers probably would have.  
Had the student done so in a nonjudgmental manner, her interest in the client’s motivations might have 
repaired harm that might have occurred from the initial reaction of judgment and assumption.
14
The client and I did not discuss the changes in negotiation strategy from the 
strategy she had authorized the student to conduct.  Speculation on her motivation, 
however, raises questions about whether unintended discrimination (Race?  Class?)
affected the client’s interactions with the student.  It is possible that the client could have 
picked up the student’s judgmental reaction to the client’s lie, felt in that judgment a 
replication of the dynamic she experienced with the housing manager, and then explained 
her rent arrears as the product of external mischance (lost/stolen money orders) to 
maintain a portrayal of herself as a client worthy of assistance.  With me, possibly
because I was the supervisor50 or a person of color or otherwise (perceived to be) more 
accepting of the client’s circumstances and motivations, the client shared a different 
aspect of herself – a person with dignity and awareness of the racism she faced – and 
instructed me accordingly.  At the same time, regardless of who her lawyer was, the 
client maintained control of her interest – demonstrating her worth as a tenant/client.  
What changed was her willingness to be explicit about her motivation.
This case and Jacobs’ and Shalleck’s critiques raise questions about how well the 
standard model of client-centered lawyering works with clients who are disenfranchised 
and often economically and racially/ethnically diverse from their lawyers.  Even though 
client-centered lawyering focuses on respecting and empowering the client, it does not 
address the dynamics of power and subordination (historical, actual, or perceived) in the 
attorney-client interaction.  Thus, suggestions to improve client-centered lawyering also 
draw on the theories of rebellious lawyering and theoretics of practice to change the 
50
 I consider my position as a clinical supervisor to be part of my cultural makeup because my experience a 
supervisor in a legal services practice in New York City and Boston have given me a cultural perspective 
and set of values that I hope is more open to issues of poverty, race, and other differences.  In addition, it is 
possible that the client reacted to me differently because of culturally-based expectations of a person with 
higher lawyer status.
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underlying discourse between lawyer and client.51  With rebellious lawyering, the 
emphasis is on the client:  how the client’s life – including her membership in an outsider 
group and her group’s history of subordination – defines the legal problem, generates the 
solutions, and determines the course of action.52  With this emphasis, the client might 
more effectively participate as an equal in the decision-making process.53
With theoretics of practice, the emphasis is on the lawyer:  how can the lawyer 
understand the “assumptions, biases, values, and norms embedded in the law’s workings 
in order to heighten awareness of the political and moral choices made by lawyers and 
the legal system”?54  How can the lawyer “listen[] to and describ[e] clients in a way that 
does not impose upon them categories constructed by lawyers”?55
Both rebellious lawyering and theoretics of practice describe approaches to 
bridging the gap – cultural and power-based – between lawyers and clients who are 
different from each other.  Building this bridge is not an easy task.  Empathy and active 
listening may elicit more details from the client, and questioning the premises of the 
American legal system may help the lawyer consciously to avoid its biases.  But the 
lawyer’s cultural lens will operate automatically to filter this information and to create 
expectations about the lawyer-client interaction.  So, unless the lawyer understands her 
51
 Jacobs, supra note 18, at 402-05; Shalleck, supra note 30, at 1748-51.
52
 Gerald P. Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice:  Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious 
Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603, 1608 (1989).  See also Jacobs, supra note 18, at 402-03 (“We cannot 
allow our students to practice on a client without seeing the client’s reality.”); and Shalleck, supra note 30, 
at 1749-50 (describes rebellious lawyering as using a client’s stories to solve problems, by accepting the 
client’s knowledge and experience as part of the legal action).
53
 Lopez, supra note 52, at 1608. Jacobs, supra note 18, at  402-03.
54
 Phyllis Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers:  Developing a Clinical Perspective on Critical Legal Theory, 43 
HASTINGS L.J. 717, 719-22 (1992).
55
 Shalleck, supra note 30, at 1751.
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own culture and the ways it affects her interactions with others, she risks perpetuating the 
status quo of discrimination.56
More recently, concerns about the human impact of lawyering has led to 
developments in “the comprehensive law movement,”57 which have implications for 
addressing the culture gap between lawyer and client.  The movement has not developed 
specifically as a response to this gap, but rather out of a concern that law exacts a heavy 
price on lawyers, clients, and others involved in litigation.58  Overall, the comprehensive 
law movement utilizes humanistic and interdisciplinary approaches to reconceptualize the 
lawyer’s and the legal system’s interactions with the client in ways that consider 
explicitly the client’s context.  This concern can lead to a focus on client context, which 
encompasses a client’s cultural and other group membership.  Because the movement 
seeks in part to improve contextualized outcomes for clients, it draws on generalist social 
work59 methods to improve lawyer-client relationships and the effectiveness and 
reputation of legal systems.60 A generalist social work model trains the professional to 
interact with clients at the individual, small group, and agency or community levels so 
56
 APA Guidelines, supra note 16, at 21, WANDA M.L. LEE, AN INTRODUCTION TO MULTICULTURAL
COUNSELING 15 (1999).  A counselor who is not culturally self-aware risks “cultural encapsulation,” or 
viewing the world from only her cultural lens.  TRACY L. ROBINSON & MARY F. HOWARD-HAMILTON, THE
CONVERGENCE OF RACE, ETHNICITY, AND GENDER:  MULTIPLE IDENTITIES IN COUNSELING 11 (2000).  
Cultural encapsulation is dangerous because it can cause errors in interpretation, strategy, and 
communication.  Lee, supra note 56, at 15.    
57
 The “comprehensive law movement,” a term coined by Susan Daicoff, refers to ten “theoretical and 
practice-based approaches . . . that aim to ‘optimize[] human well-being’ and focus[] on ‘extra-legal 
concerns,’ including the emotions of those involved and relationships.”  Hartley & Petrucci, supra note 10, 
at 135, quoting Susan Daicoff, The Role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence within the Comprehensive Law 
Movement in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE:  LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 465-67 (Dennis 
P. Stolle et al. eds., 2000).  The ten approaches are preventive law, therapeutic jurisprudence, procedural 
justice, restorative justice, facilitative mediation, transformative mediation, holistic law, collaborative law, 
creative problem solving, and specialized courts.  Id. at 135 n. 12.
58 See generally Susan Daicoff, The Comprehensive Law Movement, 19 TOURO L. REV. 825, 825-35
(2004).
59
 A generalist social worker has “’knowledge and skills [that] encompass a broad spectrum and [] 
assess[es] problems and their solutions comprehensively.’”  Hartley & Petrucci, supra note 10, at 140 n.43 
quoting ROBERT L. BARKER, THE SOCIAL WORK DICTIONARY 190 (4th ed. 1999)
60 Id. at 135.
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that the “organizational context” of the client is integral to any interaction.61  As part of 
that contextual interaction, the client’s culture is vital, and the professional must learn to 
interact in a client-centered,62 culturally competent manner.63
Training in multicultural lawyering brings together the approaches championed 
by rebellious lawyering, theoretics of practice, and the comprehensive law movement by 
“combin[ing] personal growth with content learning and skill development.”64 As a 
starting point, multiculturalists focus on a broad understanding of culture as “unstated 
assumptions, shared values, and characteristic ways of perceiving the world that are 
normally taken for granted by its members.”65 Multicultural lawyering training teaches 
the student to be aware of the cultural basis for his own behavior and champions using “a 
‘cultural lens’ as a central focus of professional behavior . . . recogniz[ing] that all 
individuals including themselves are influenced by different contexts, including the 
historical, ecological, sociopolitical, and disciplinary.”66 Thus, the student develops a 
“’personal-cultural orientation’” toward lawyering in which she considers how her and 
61 Id. at 140-41.
62
 In social work, client-centeredness entails “’be[ing] where the client is.’”  Id. at 143.  Thus, if the client 
believes that she experiences discrimination in her daily interactions, then the professional must 
acknowledge that perspective to be effective in working with the client.  Id. at 144.
63 Id. at 141.
64
 Lee, supra note 56, at 196.  “’The cognitive distance between the mental health service providers and the 
lower class and minority consumers can be bridged through didactic instruction, but the social and 
emotional distance can be reduced only through an intensive program of reeducation of the counselors, one 
aimed at changing their attitudes.’”  Id. at 196 (quotation omitted).  But see Ridley, supra note 39, at  24-
25:  “Consciousness raising is an inadequate method of combating racism.”  Instead, Ridley advocates 
changing racist behavior because behavior is easier to change.  Id. at 24-25.  
65
 Robinson & Howard-Hamilton, supra note 56, at 11 (quotation omitted).  Bryant provides a list of factors 
that influence culture, including “ethnicity, race, gender, nationality, age, economic status, social status, 
language, sexual orientation, physical characteristics, marital status, role in family, birth order, immigrant 
status, religion, accent, skin color.”  Bryant, supra note 18, at  41.  This article accepts these factors as 
cultural influences but notes that race, ethnicity, and national origin remain particularly salient in American 
culture.
66
 APA Guidelines, supra note 16, at 11.  
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others’ behavior is guided by culturally learned expectations and values.67  With such 
knowledge and regular practice, the student is better equipped to develop more accurate 
decision making that is less biased by the cultural backgrounds of either the lawyer or the 
client or by the complexity of the problem presented.68
II.  Current Methods of Teaching Multicultural Lawyering
To develop this personal-cultural orientation, multicultural counseling trainers 
recommend a three-fold approach:  developing awareness and knowledge of one’s own 
culture; developing awareness of the client’s culture; and learning specific skills to 
minimize the impact of one’s own biases and prejudices toward the multicultural 
interaction.69 Within each of these domains, students focus on becoming competent 
cognitively, affectively, and behaviorally.70
By contrast, some of the literature of multicultural lawyering emphasizes
developing awareness of the client’s culture, without delving into developing cultural 
self-awareness.  For example, Stefan Krieger and Richard Neumann urge that students 
acquire “an instinct for situations where another person’s cultural assumptions may be 
very different from yours.”71  To develop this instinct, they suggest a three-step process:  
(1) learn about the other cultures an attorney is most likely to encounter; (2) anticipate 
67
 Both common sense and empirical studies support the proposition that culturally learned beliefs about 
differences among cultural groups affect interpersonal interactions across groups.  Hartley & Petrucci, 
supra note 10, at 162.  These beliefs need not be stereotypes but are often social constructions, or “cultural 
characterizations or popular images individuals hold that serve to define certain groups in society.”  Id. at 
163-64.  “The more strongly held the social construction, the more resistant are the attitudes associated 
with the construction to new and contradictory information.”  Id. at 164.
68
 Bryant, supra note 18, at 56; Ridley, supra note 39, at 56.
69
 Arredondo & Arciniega, supra note 16, at 266.  Sue & Sue, supra note 16, at 224-25.  The benefit of this 
approach is that it is a competence model – in contrast with earlier models, which “suggest something or 
someone needs to be fixed,”  Arredondo & Arciniega, supra note 18, at 265-66 – and thus “provides 
guidelines and developmental benchmarks for adaptive cognitive, emotional, and behavioral attributes.”  
Id. at 266.
70 Id. at 265-66; Bryant, supra note 18, at 48; Robinson & Howard-Hamilton, supra note 56, at 272; Sue & 
Sue, supra note 16, at 17.
71
 Krieger & Neumann, supra note 18, at 53.
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situations in which taking culture into account will improve lawyering and plan non-
stereotyped, non-offensive behavior; and (3) apologize in a prompt and straightforward 
manner if a mistake occurs.72  Thus awareness of the other, rather than of the self, takes 
precedence.
Paul Tremblay, like Krieger and Neumann, urges lawyers to anticipate the most 
likely areas of cultural differences and the way these differences affect the multicultural 
interaction.  But whereas Krieger and Neumann do not detail cultural differences, 
Tremblay identifies six areas in which differences are most likely to occur – proxemics,73
kinesics,74 time and priority considerations,75 narrative preferences,76 relational 
perspectives,77 and scientific orientation.78  Tremblay posits that knowledge of cultural 
differences in these areas will assist the lawyer in avoiding cultural blunders.79
The law students I work with tend to turn first to this kind of  substantive cultural 
training when working with a client who appears racially or ethnically different from 
themselves. This inclination is not wrong, but too narrow a focus on knowledge of 
cultural difference carries several risks.  A 1992 study by Stephan and Stephan reveals 
that one risk of a narrow focus is anxiety about difference affecting interaction.  In this 
study, the authors followed a group of American students going to Morocco, to consider 
72 Id. 
73
 Tremblay, supra note 18, at 389-92 (“’perception and use of personal and interpersonal space’”)
74 Id. at  392-95 (“way in which bodily movements are used and interpreted;” i.e. expressions, eye contact, 
hand shakes, posture, gestures)
75 Id. at 395-96.
76 Id. at 396-99.
77 Id. at 400-03 (individual vs. collective orientations)
78 Id. at 403-06 (acceptance or not of science e.g., medicine thru science or faith)
79 Id. at 385-86.  Tremblay also warns students to beware the trap of book knowledge.  He labels his 
suggestions “heuristics” to emphasize the necessity of “train[ing] lawyers in the discipline of naïveté and in 
accepting the tentativeness of our assumptions, with ‘informed not-knowing.’”  Id. at 407.  He also advises 
students to cultivate their own cultural identities, including acknowledging biases and oppression that their 
culture contains.  Id. at 414.
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how the students handled immersion in a new culture.80  The students received lectures 
on cultural differences and classes on the history and culture of Morocco prior to their 
arrival.  However, upon their arrival in Morocco, this instruction did not improve the 
students’ interactions.  Instead, the study determined that the students’ increased 
awareness of the differences between the cultures, of their own cultural incompetence, 
and of the pitfalls in navigating the culture increased the students’ anxiety.81  Stephan and 
Stephan hypothesize in part that a better instructional method, namely a combination of 
lectures and simulation, would more effectively help students to interact with a culture 
different from their own by allowing the students to practice using the substantive
cultural knowledge they had acquired.82
Many students react to a culturally different client with an anxiety similar to that 
of the students’ in the Stephan and Stephan study.  That anxiety then can manifest in 
multiple ways:  as unconscious avoidance – the student who postpones meeting with a 
disability client diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder for fear of asking 
questions about the illness and having to cope with the client’s responses; or tentativeness 
during the interaction – the student who self-consciously shies away from eye contact 
with an Asian-American client; or overeagerness – the student who recalls her repertoire 
of high-school Spanish to greet a Guatemalan client.83  These reactions are 
80
 The study was conducted by Stephan and Stephan to determine how empathy and attributional 
complexity (the tendency to attribute complex causes to other’s behavior) affect immersion in a new 
culture.  Jacobs, supra note 18, at 398-401.  
81 Id. at 400.
82 Id. at 400-01.  This combination of substance knowledge and simulation, of course, is central to clinical 
pedagogy.
83
 At first glance, the effort to communicate with a client in his primary language might not seem culturally 
insensitive, as the student intends the exchange to respect the client’s culture and to put him at ease.  
However, the impact on the client might be quite different.  As Lisa Navareete of the National Council of 
La Raza commented on the first Democratic presidential candidates’ debate held in Albuquerque, NM, on 
September 4, 2003, the candidates’ efforts at Spanish, “”Speaking Spanish is nice, . . . [b]ut it’s not really 
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counterproductive; they overemphasize the cultural differences between lawyer and client 
and, therefore, interfere with the creation of a secure, nonjudgmental environment in 
which the lawyer and client can interact.84
A second risk is that a focus on cultural knowledge can give students “a false 
sense of accomplishment”85 that the acquisition alone of such knowledge enables them to 
work with members of that particular culture. 86 This sense can cause students to resist 
exploring their own cultures and attitudes toward other cultural groups 87 and can 
reinforce the notion of the client as “the other.”  If, however, a student understands her 
relationship to her own culture and the ways that culture creates or reinforces stereotypes,
she might not presume that information on cultural differences is accurate for a given 
client, and she might alter her lawyering to fit the actual client, not the essentialized one.
what the Latino community is looking for, and it’s not what they’re going to vote on.”  “¿Quién es más 
gringo?” BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 7, 2003, at A26.
84
 Wehrly points out that substantive knowledge of the client’s culture is helpful as a means of establishing 
the counselor’s credibility with the client:  does the counselor prove to be an “effective and trustworthy 
helper” by appropriately using the substantive knowledge and giving something of value to the client at 
each session?  Wehrly, supra note 22, at 172.
85 Id. at 140.
86 The “cookbook approach” to diversity training – chapter 1 Working with African Americans; chapter 2 
Working with Latinos, etc. – can lead students to “’buy into’ the content of a particular manuscript or 
‘expert.’” Id. at 172.  The prevalence of such manuscripts and their often unavoidable length in 
multicultural competence manuals lend further credence to their importance that can outweigh the brief 
warnings not to accept whole cloth generalizations about cultural differences.  See, e.g., Lawyers as 
Counselors, supra note 25, at 32-40 (the section on stereotyping consists of approximately one page of text 
but the section describing cultural differences necessarily takes more space, here approximately three 
pages).  Pedersen warns against the “presumption that multiculturalism in counselor education is merely 
accumulating additional knowledge about other cultures, without regard to the underlying assumptions or 
the consequent skills that are necessary.”  Pederson, supra note 16, at 209 (citation omitted).  Similarly, 
Bryant warns that, as students “learn specific cultural rules, [they] have to be careful to apply them 
correctly and to guard against substituting them for information about the client.”  Bryant, supra note 18, at 
86-87.  Some of the risks a cookbook approach entails are that obstacles that arise in the lawyering 
relationship might be attributed to personal difference rather than institutional practice and preference and 
that these differences might be seen as deficiencies that leave intact White American culture as the norm.  
See Lisa C. Ikemoto, Racial Disparities in Health Care and Cultural Competency, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 
75, 100 (2003) (noting that cultural competence training that “describes a set body of ‘facts’ about the 
exotic other can reinscribe existing stereotypes”).  
87
 Wehrly, supra note 22, at 140 (citation omitted).  
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For example, a student who had a Central American woman client seeking a 
divorce worried that the client might not feel entitled to any marital property because the 
student had heard that Latina women generally had a different conception of marital 
property than the one espoused by Massachusetts divorce law.  The student therefore 
planned a counseling session to educate the client about Massachusetts law and empower 
her to ask for her legal entitlement.  I encouraged the student not to assume that the client 
held this belief but to inquire directly of the client before she launched her planned 
counseling.  The student did inquire of the client, and the client indicated a very strong 
sense of entitlement to marital property, including payment of debt.  
A third risk is that the student who is unaware of his own culture may not 
examine his reactions to information about a different culture for unconscious biases or 
prejudices that impair cultural competence.  An infamous example of the use of cultural 
information in a manner that reinforced cultural stereotypes occurred in the case of Dong 
Lu Chen, a Chinese immigrant88 who had killed his wife with a claw hammer because he 
believed she was having an affair.89
At the bench trial, Chen’s attorney presented a “cultural defense:” that Chinese 
values about adultery, community, and saving face had caused Chen to kill his wife and, 
therefore, that Chen had acted without criminal intent.90  The defense came in through the 
testimony of a white male anthropologist, Burton Pasternak.91  Pasternak posited that a 
88
 Chen and his wife had been living in the United States for approximately one year when he killed her.  
Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture:  Asian Women & the “Cultural Defense,” 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 
57, 65 (1994).  I base the discussion that follows on Volpp’s account of the trial and sentencing hearing.
89
 People v. Dong Lu Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 1988).  This article does not discuss the 
merits of using a cultural defense, as does Volpp’s article.  Rather, this article considers how the expert’s 
testimony and his audience’s reaction to it were filtered through each one’s cultural lens.
90
 Volpp, supra note 88, at  64.
91
 Pasternak may have been a dubious expert.  On cross examination, he cited as sources for his depiction 
of Chinese culture fieldwork he had conducted from the 1960s to 1980s, including some incidents he had 
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Chinese male would react to adultery by his wife “in a much more volatile, violent way” 
than an American male like himself would.92  He further pontificated that the Chinese 
values of the sanctity of family and the need for collective social control over the 
behavior of individuals effectively required a man to act against an adulterous wife to 
reaffirm the cultural values, to reassert control over his wife, and, through these 
corrective measures, to maintain his desirability as a partner to other Chinese women.93
Indeed, Pasternak asserted that these values were so prevalent that they effectively were 
voices that Chen carried with him constantly.94  Pasternak added that a Chinese male 
cuckold in the United States would suffer even more than he would in China because he 
would not be able to find a white woman partner due to sexual stereotypes regarding 
Chinese men and, as a “’pariah’” within the Chinese-American community, would be 
unable to find a new Chinese partner or general support.95
On its face, the legal strategy employed by Chen’s attorney, Stewart Orden, might 
appear to epitomize multicultural lawyering.  The strategy, after all, took into 
consideration the defendant’s cultural background and attempted to explain that 
background (at least as depicted by Pasternak) to the court to benefit the client legally.96
However, a primary goal of multicultural lawyering is applying generalized cultural 
seen or heard about.  He failed, however, to remember even his own articles on the subject.  Id. at 70.  His 
qualifications and the court’s acceptance of them point out the difficulty of determining the reliability of 
cultural information and raise questions about how a person decides to accept generalized cultural 
information.
92 Id. at 66 (citations omitted).  Pasternak in fact identified himself as an “average American.”  Id. at 70 
(citation omitted).
93 Id. at 68-9 (citation omitted).  Pasternak implicitly assumed that Chinese women also accept this cultural 
view.
94 Id. at 68 (citation omitted).
95 Id. at 69-70 (citation omitted).
96
 Indeed, the defense strategy might have reflected Mr. Chen’s preference.  For instance, the defendant, 
who apparently had heard voices since 1968 – id. at 64 (citation omitted) – might have been unwilling to 
plead insanity due to an aversion to being labeled insane or to being held in a psychiatric facility should an 
insanity defense succeed or to serving a long(er) prison sentence.
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knowledge accurately in light of an individual’s circumstances.97  The cultural defense 
put forth by Orden instead undermined this goal.
From a multicultural perspective, a problem with the defense employed on Chen’s 
behalf is that it is suffused with assumptions and stereotypes about American and 
Chinese culture.  At the core of the defense is a belief that “American” and “Chinese” are 
“two utterly distinct categories:  ‘American’ does not encompass immigrant Chinese.”98
This belief underlies Pasternak’s assertions (1) that a Chinese man would act differently 
from an American man who learned that his wife was having an affair; (2) that regardless 
of his mental health, a Chinese man would react violently to this knowledge, especially 
given the social pressure to control his family; and (3) that a Chinese man whether living 
in a China that has more contact with American culture or in the United States would not 
have incorporated American cultural beliefs (presumably, in this context, a less violent 
reaction to marital infidelity).99  Thus, Pasternak’s testimony began and ended on the
premise of an essentialized Chinese man, rooted in a culture completely foreign from 
American culture and inassimilable.
Pasternak seemed not to realize that his essentialization of a Chinese man was 
rooted in his perception of himself as an “average American.”  This self-identification 
reveals his ignorance of his own culture – in which non-Chinese men also kill their wives 
– and its longstanding, historic depiction of all Chinese as the consummate foreigners. 100
97 See infra pp. 25-26.
98
 Volpp, supra note 88, at 66 (citation omitted).  According to Pasternak, “American” does include “white 
Anglo-Saxons, Jews, Blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Roman Catholics.” Id. at 71 n. 64 (citation omitted).
99 Id. at 67-72 (citation omitted).
100 Id. at 66 n. 43.  As an historical example, Volpp quotes Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U.S. 537, 561 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting):  “’There is a race so different from our own that we do 
not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States.  Persons belonging to it are, with 
few exceptions, absolutely excluded from our country.  I allude to the Chinese race.’”  In addition, Volpp 
points out that Pasternak’s “fetishization” of  the Chinese people follows the tradition of Orientalism, 
25
Aspects of this premise were accepted by the prosecutor, Arthur Rigby, and the 
judge, Brooklyn Supreme Court Justice Edward Pincus.  Rigby, for example, accepted 
the categorization of China as an insular, backwards country when he asked whether 
China had been liberalized since the United States normalized diplomatic relations with 
the current regime.101  Pincus, while recognizing that some Chinese immigrants might 
assimilate,102 explained that the “very cogent forceful testimony of Doctor Pasternak” 
led him to believe that Chen had killed his wife because he both carried the voices of his 
Chinese values with him and lacked the “safety valve” of a Chinese community to 
prevent his attack on her.103 Pincus therefore convicted Chen of second degree 
manslaughter and sentenced him to five years’ probation.104
Because we, like Pasternak, Rigby, and Pincus, filter substantive information 
through our own cultural lens, we must be vigilant in confronting our own biases and 
prejudices and beware stereotyping the individual client with whom we are working.105
As Sue Bryant admonishes, the culturally competent lawyer must acknowledge her own 
cultural persona, analyze how it affects the client relationship, acquire knowledge about 
which delineates Asians as the ultimate “other” from Westerners, including Americans.  Volpp, supra note 
88, at 71-72.
101 Id. at 72 (citation omitted).
102
 Pincus noted that “’Were this crime committed by the defendant as someone who was born and raised in 
America, or born elsewhere but primarily raised in America, even in the Chinese American community,’” 
he would have found Chen guilty of first degree manslaughter.  Id. at 73 (citation omitted) (emphasis 
added).
103 Id. at 73 and 67 n. 46 (citation omitted).
104 Id. at 64 and n. 26 (citation omitted).  Indeed, the court integrated its new knowledge of Chinese culture 
into the sentencing decision:  
‘And I must have a promise from the defendant on his honor and his honor of his family 
he will abide by all of the rules and conditions that I impose . . . . And if he does not obey 
and he violates any of these conditions, not only does he face jail, but this will be a total 
loss of face.’
Id. (citation omitted)
105
 Bryant, supra note 18, at 53-54; Tremblay, supra note 18, at 415-16.
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the client’s culture but apply it accurately, and interact based on the actual details of the 
client’s circumstances.106 By starting with cultural self-awareness, the lawyer is better 
able to understand the client’s culture and the interaction of the two cultures.  Thus, the 
key to developing multicultural competence is cultural self-awareness.107
For practical guidance to develop cultural self-awareness, students can turn to the 
five habits for cross-cultural lawyering that Bryant and Jean Koh Peters have devised.108
The habits are designed to encourage awareness cognitively, emotionally, and 
behaviorally.  For example, Habit 1, Degrees of Separation and Connection, focuses on 
cognition and behavior:  it asks students to identify similarities and differences between 
the student and the client and to consider how these aspects affect information gathering/ 
processing and professional distance/judgment.109 By deliberately identifying similarities 
and differences, the lawyer can challenge assumptions about himself and the client, probe 
106
 Bryant, supra note 18, at 86-87; Tremblay, supra note 18, at 408-09.
107
 Tremblay, supra note 18, at 415-16;  Jacobs, supra note 18, at 395.
108
 Bryant, supra note 18, at 33.  The habits are:  (1) Degrees of Separation and Connection (charting 
similarities and differences between lawyer and client and considering their significance); (2) The Three 
Rings (expanding Habit 1 to include the legal decision-maker); (3) Parallel Universes (exploring alternative 
interpretations to client behavior); (4) Red Flags and Remedies (paying conscious attention to multicultural 
communication); and (5) The Camel’s Back (developing self-awareness to understand situations that make 
distortion more likely).  The five habits are the product of collaboration between Bryant and Jean Koh-
Peters that began in the early 1990s.  Along the way, the collaboration has produced numerous 
presentations on teaching multicultural lawyering and supported Koh-Peters’ work in child advocacy, in 
particular as supplemental materials in her book, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE
PROCEEDINGS:  ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS, originally published in 1997 and now in its second 
edition.
Habit 5 is designed specifically to address cultural self-awareness, although Habits 1 through 4 
require some cultural self-awareness to work effectively.  Bryant notes that other teachers have questioned 
the decision to make cultural self-awareness the last habit rather than the first.  Bryant explains the decision 
thus:  “Habit [5] can be the most difficult in that it asks the student to face the sometimes ugly side of 
cultural blinders - bias and stereotype.  Moreover, the other Habits give insight and understanding that may 
ultimately help students recognize bias.”  Bryant, supra note 18, at 77.  Although I agree that engaging 
cultural self-awareness can be a difficult process for students, my hope is that awareness of the social and 
cognitive processes that automatically occur in human interactions can help to diffuse the reactions to 
facing the “ugly side of cultural blinders” and to encourage students to engage in reflection and analysis, 
not judgment or blame.  Hence my suggestion to teach psychology explicitly as preparation for and 
alongside the concrete Habits.
109 Id. at 64-68.
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for facts, and lawyer based on fact.110  Habit 5, The Camel’s Back, encourages cultural 
self-awareness, specifically with regard to bias and stereotype.  First, the student 
identifies factors like stress, lack of control, and burn out that disrupt the lawyer-client 
interaction and make bias and stereotype more likely to intrude.  That identification 
permits proactive efforts to minimize future interference.  Second, and in conjunction 
with Habit 1, the student identifies client traits and personal traits that cause the lawyer to 
treat the client with insensitivity.111
Because of their concreteness, the habits for cross-cultural lawyering and
Tremblay’s related heuristics add depth to the process espoused by Krieger and Neumann 
and are particularly valuable in clinical teaching.  Their use helps students to change 
behavior to foster better lawyering for the individual client; the culturally-aware lawyer 
might hear the client’s narrative more accurately and relay it to the legal decision maker
with less distortion112 or engage the client more fully in a decision to exploit a cultural 
stereotype.  In addition, Krieger and Neumann’s reminder to apologize can help to repair 
respect, trust, and open communication when mistakes in multicultural interactions occur.
Such mistakes are inevitable, sometimes because generalized cultural knowledge 
is inaccurate on its face or as applied to a specific client and sometimes because a 
behavior betraying bias or prejudice can occur automatically, before the habits, heuristics, 
and newly developing instinct kick in.  Thus, to better inculcate an approach to 
multicultural interactions, an understanding of unconscious or automatic discrimination is 
110 Id. at 66-68.
111
 Susan Bryant & Jean Koh-Peters, Five Habits for Cross-Cultural Lawyering:  A Work in Progress 34, 
available at http://cleaweb.org/multiculture/multiculture.pdf (last visited on August 20, 2004) (copy on file 
with author); Bryant, supra note 18, at 77-78.
112
 Bryant, supra note 18, at 56 (the “primary goal is . . . ‘isomorphic attributions,’ i.e., to attribute same 
meaning to behavior and words that the person intended to convey); Shalleck, supra note 30, at 1751.
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necessary to supplement the habits and heuristics of multicultural lawyering. 113 This 
understanding is rooted in cognitive and social psychology, including the formation of 
cognitive categories or schemas, group behavior, and awareness of the individual’s place 
within the dominant culture.114
III.  The Psychological Underpinnings of Multicultural Lawyering Training
Why is some understanding of cognitive115 and social116 psychology necessary?  
Because, currently in our society, we typically do not discriminate intentionally against 
people who differ from ourselves.117 So, lawyers treat clients in culturally insensitive 
113
 Earlier studies have argued that, to reduce prejudice and discrimination, the perceiver must be aware of 
her bias and be motivated to change these biases based on their personal values.  However, more recent 
studies suggest that personal motivation and self-awareness are not the only ways to decrease prejudice.  
Rather, implicit positive attitudes associated with White Americans can be weakened significantly by 
exposure to different societal cues and social contexts.  For example, one experiment repeatedly exposed 
participants to images of famous and admired Black Americans and to infamous and disliked White 
Americans.  The results demonstrate at least a temporary, significant reduction in automatic racial 
associations.  Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes:  
Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY AND
SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 800 (2001), available at 
http://www.apa.org/journals/psp/press_releases/november_2001/psp815800.html (last visited July 23, 
2004).  Cf. Poirier, supra note 12, at 1120-21 (need “to address head-on the source of cognitive tagging of 
social roles w/gender traits” to equalize women’s participation in professional employment).
114
 Poirier, supra note 12, at 1076, 1085.
115
 Cognitive psychology concerns the study of human cognition, including attention, perception, learning, 
memory, thinking, problem solving, decision making, and language.  Cognitive psychology, in ANDREW M. 
COLMAN, A DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY (2001), available at
http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t87.e1617 (last visited 
February 2, 2005).
116 Social psychology concerns the study of social behavior of individuals or groups, such as attitudes, 
social compliance, conformity, obedience to authority, interpersonal attraction, attribution processes, group 
processes, helping behavior, and non-verbal communication.  Social psychology, in ANDREW M. 
COLMAN, A DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY (2001), available at
http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t87.e7760 (last visited 
February 2, 2005).
117The APA reports that  “many people who firmly believe that they have open and favorable attitudes 
about people of various races and ethnicities will demonstrate that they implicitly (unconsciously) harbor a 
variety of racial and ethnic prejudices that can translate into subtle discriminatory behaviors.”  APA amicus 
brief, supra note 8, at 6.   For example, in one study, the participants consistently made quicker associations 
between faces of African Americans and words with negative concepts – such as bomb, devil, awful – than 
they did between faces of White Americans and words with positive concepts – such as peace, joy, and 
love.  Id. at 8. 
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ways due to “unconscious or aversive racism,”118 which can stem from categorization
errors that characterize cognitive functioning119 and from unconscious tendencies to favor 
members of social groups similar to themselves over members of other groups.120
Learning more about these psychological processes provides a basis for understanding 
how lawyers behave in ways that cause discrimination and, therefore, how to assess their 
own beliefs and lawyering practices.121
A lawyer who understands that he has subconscious cognitive categories – called 
schemas – and that the way he automatically employs them can cause subordinating
treatment might be less defensive about acknowledging that his behavior is
discriminatory.  In addition, awareness of how a schema is created might enable a
dominant-culture lawyer to understand how that culture influences the contents of his
schemas122 and to make conscious efforts to diversify his interactions and to question the 
In another study, the researchers considered how employers reacted to African-American sounding 
names (Lakisha, Jamal) compared to White American sounding names (Emily, Greg) in the labor market.  
The researchers answered approximately 5,000 classified advertisements, sending a set of four resumes to 
each posting.   Each set of resumes included two better qualified applicants and two lesser qualified 
applicants.  The study demonstrated two levels of discrimination:  White-American sounding names 
received 50% more call backs than African-American sounding names, and the better resume assisted 
White-American sounding names by 30% but only minimally assisted African-American sounding names.  
Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and 
Jamal?  A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination 2-3, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=422902 (last visited August 3, 2004).
Social scientists warn that unconscious racism is more likely among helping professionals.  This 
racism occurs because “[c]ounselors often assume that their good intentions automatically make them 
helpful[,]” and, therefore, do not monitor the consequences of their behavior.  Ridley, supra note 39, at 10-
11.
118
 Poirier, supra note 12, at 1073 and n2; Ridley, supra note 39, at 10.
119
 Krieger, supra note 18, at 1165.
120
 Ridley, supra note 39, at 13-15.  Ridley describes this group thinking as “either/or thinking” in which 
we place people into single, mutually exclusive categories with the subtle belief that our own group is 
superior, or in some cases supreme.  This kind of thinking seems to be the type engaged by Pasternak in his 
testimony on behalf of Dong Lu Chen.  See supra pp. 22-25.
121
 Ridley, supra note 39, at 15.
122
 Poirier, supra note 12, at 1075 (calling gender schemas “mechanisms of dominance and subordination”).  
Social scientists posit that, “[i]f we meaningfully change that world – ‘the larger societal context that 
controls these phenomena’ – we can thereby change individuals’ classification strategies and thus reduce 
both unconscious bias and its behavioral effects.”  Ridley, supra note 39, at 15.  Indeed, research indicates 
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contents of his schemas in an effort to act with more accuracy regarding members of 
different cultures.123  Such a change could more easily allow the client’s life, including 
her membership in an outsider group and that group’s history of subordination, to define 
the legal problem, generate the solutions, and determine the course of action.124
Let us consider then, how schemas are created and how they affect our behavior:  
A lawyer meeting a client automatically places the client into a cognitive category or 
schema.  The schema itself is not inherently bad.  Rather, it is simply a means of 
organizing information “to identify objects, make predictions about the future, infer the 
existence of unobservable traits or properties, and attribute the causation of events.”125 A 
schema thus enables people to process information quickly and largely automatically.126
We create our schemas through the experience of our daily lives, from personal 
encounters, second-hand information, the media, etc. Behavior becomes associated with 
race, gender, age, roles, and character traits, and event scripts127 develop through 
repetition.128  With regard to people, physical characteristics like skin color, gender, and 
age are readily perceived and therefore are more likely to become salient features in our 
that “positive exposure to members of other racial groups helps reduce such biases.”  Id. at 13.  (citing 
Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
REV. 242 (2002)).
123
 APA Amicus Brief, supra note 8, at 12-13.  (citations omitted).  Meaningful encounters with new racial 
information requires the individual to develop new schema and behaviors to cope with the new 
information, and if these new schema and behaviors are effective, the individual can develop a more mature 
cultural identity status that allows more accurate, autonomous multicultural interaction.  Hartley & 
Petrucci, supra note 10, at 167.
124
 Shalleck, supra note 30, at 1749-50 (describes rebellious lawyering as using a client’s stories to solve 
problems by accepting the client’s knowledge and experience as part of the legal action).
125
 Krieger, supra note 18, at 1188-89.  Taylor-Thompson, supra note 18, at 1290-91.
126
 APA Guidelines, supra note 16, at 19 (citation omitted).
127
 An event script is the expectation of a “particular sequence of causally related events.”  Krieger and 
Neumann give the example of a script for going to a restaurant:  being seated, getting a menu, giving one’s 
order, and being served. Krieger & Neumann, supra note 18, at 131.  
128
 Poirier, supra note 12, at 1093; Krieger & Neumann, supra note 18, at 131. 
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cognitive categories.129 Each category then becomes a prototype or reference point for 
the people we meet, and we interact with others based on the category that is activated.130
If we do not question the expectations evoked by the activated category, insensitive 
behavior can result.131
For example, at an AALS clinical education conference, I was approached by a 
fellow clinician who, out of the blue, wanted to know if I knew the Hong Kong – U.S. 
dollar exchange rate.  What had struck him most about me was not that I am a clinician or 
an American – even though we were in Canada – but that I look (and am) Asian (-
American), and my ethnicity evoked a schema that said Asian appearance = Hong Kong
= foreigner, so he asked his question.132
This kind of social categorization operates on an automatic level.  Based on one’s
own characteristics, a person sorts others into “in-groups” sharing characteristics with the 
perceiver and “out-groups” that do not.133  The separation of others into in-groups and 
out-groups further influences the way in which the perceiver views others.  So, if a 
lawyer has limited experience with members of different cultures, then the behavior of 
those few members of the out-group culture becomes more salient and may be seen as 
representative of that culture.134 In addition, the perceiver may use her in-group as a 
reference point for interpreting her own behavior as well as that of others. 135  On a 
129
 Poirier, supra note 12, at  1093-94.
130
 Krieger, supra note 18, at 1200-01.
131
 Indeed, a person with low levels of prejudice “must be conscious of the stereotype as stereotype in order 
to avoid unconscious reliance on it.”  Taylor-Thompson, supra note 18, at 1289.  Cf.  Krieger & Neumann, 
supra note 18, at 180-81 (advising attorneys to evaluate credibility of witnesses by considering schemas 
used in processing facts)
132
 I didn’t know the answer.
133
 APA Guidelines, supra note 16, at 19 (citation omitted).
134
 The presence of only one member of an out-group makes that one person’s presence more distinctive 
and memorable so that a stronger schema can result.  Krieger, supra note 18, at 1192, 1194-95.
135
 Lee, supra note 56, at 10-11.
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subconscious level, she may exaggerate differences among groups and favor members of 
her in-group over members of out-groups.136  “In-groups are more highly valued, more 
trusted, and engender greater cooperation as opposed to competition, and those with the 
strongest in-group affiliation also show the most prejudice.”137
A problem with schemas is that they are susceptible to unconscious biases and 
stereotyping.  A stereotype is “a generalized description of a group of people that has 
usually developed over time on the basis of cross-cultural interactions.”138 Because a 
stereotype can become ingrained in a schema, the stereotype can create an unconscious 
expectation that a specific individual will behave in conformity with the stereotype.139  If 
the expectation is distorted or illusory – as it was in the case of Dong Lu Chen – then the 
perceiver might unconsciously be biased in the way she interacts with the client.140
When the client comes from a culture different from the lawyer’s, the risk of 
stereotyping is greater.141  Experience with members of the client’s culture that was seen 
as negative is more readily recalled, 142 and thus the lawyer runs the risk of expecting 
136
 APA Guidelines, supra note 16, at 19-20 (citations omitted).  “Prejudice occurs when a person takes his 
or her own group as the positive reference point from which to judge other people negatively.”  Lee, supra 
note 56, at 10.
137
 APA Guidelines, supra note 16, at 19-20 (citations omitted).  Taylor-Thompson describes a chilling 
example of group-related bias in a study regarding perceptions of a criminal defendant’s honesty or guilt.  
The participants watched a simulated robbery trial and then had to reach a unanimous verdict and, if that 
verdict was of guilt, recommend a sentence.  The “defendant” did not testify at trial, and the participants 
saw him only when he entered a plea of not guilty.  The study determined that majority white juries were 
less likely to believe the defendant to be honest when he was Latino and also more likely to convict with 
recommendations for the maximum sentence.  Taylor-Thompson, supra note 18, at 1293 (describing study 
conducted by Dolores Perez in 1993).
138
 APA Guidelines, supra note 16, at 11 (citation omitted).   Familiarity with a stereotype should not imply 
prejudice, which is the “endorsement of negative attitudes toward and stereotypes about groups.”  Id. at 21; 
Taylor-Thompson, supra note 18, at 1291.
139
 Poirier, supra note 12, at 1098-99; APA amicus brief, supra note 8, at 10 (citations omitted)
140
 Krieger, supra note 18, at 1198.
141 Id. at 1204.
142 Id. at 1192.  By contrast, the lawyer typically has more data about members of her culture so that she is 
able to understand the complexity of factors at play in an interaction with another in-group client.  Id. at 
1194-95.  Hence the habit of parallel universes:  thinking of alternative, often situational explanations for 
behavior.
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negative behavior and finding it, whether or not it actually occurred.143 In addition, the 
lawyer is more likely to attribute behaviors of the out-group client to character traits if the 
behaviors fit the expectation and to situational factors if the behavior seems aberrant.144
Then, the lawyer might start to label the client who does not return phone calls as rude or 
uncaring instead of considering that work, personal, child-related, or other factors might 
cause the delay.145
Given these problems with cognitive schemas, one might become discouraged, 
wondering whether we could ever become culturally competent.  Explicit discussion of 
the schemas and stereotypes we hold, however, might enable us to uncover the hidden 
assumptions.146  Thus, the teaching of nonracist behaviors, coupled with cognitive and 
social psychology, can help lawyers to examine their values, biases, and prejudices and 
therefore to change their behaviors and attitudes.
To consider how schema are created and can affect behavior, let us review the 
situation of my student working with the public housing tenant.  When the student began 
the clinic, her experience with legal clients was scarce.  At that time, her schema of a 
client was her mother – a white, small-business owner, married to a minister.  The student 
could not imagine her mother lying, especially to her lawyer, or being financially 
143 Id. at 1208.
144 Id. at 1205-07.  For example, “failures” by members of an out-group are more likely to be attributed to 
the person than to the situation.  But when a failure occurs with members of an in-group, the in-group 
observer has greater familiarity with the group and more data about the groups from which to posit 
complex external factors leading to failure.  Id. at 1207.
145
 Jean Koh Peters tells the story of a student who was unable to reach his/her client.  The student dutifully, 
if rotely, recited alternative explanations for this failure (Habit 3) but clearly did not consider them 
credible.  Finally, on the day of court, the client did appear, and the student learned that she had given birth 
in the interim.  Jean Koh Peters, Access to Justice:  The Social Responsibility of Lawyers:  Habit, Story, 
and Delight, Essential Tools for the Public Service Advocate, 7 WASH. U. L.J. & POLICY 17, 19 (2001).
146
 Taylor-Thompson, supra note 18, at 1288-89.  At BCLAB, a common student assumption is that a client 
will not want to discuss her mental illness, even if it is the basis for a disability claim.  Consequently, in 
supervision, we will discuss this concern, including questioning whether it is the student’s own discomfort 
with mental illness, grounded in cultural stigma, which is the basis for concern.  Typically, once the student 
has met the client, the student will be surprised at the client’s openness about the illness.  
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irresponsible.  Thus, her encounter with the client who lied was a startling event.  The 
student might incorporate this experience into her existing client schema.  Her client 
schema might now recognize that clients might lie or, more specifically, that poor, black 
American clients might lie.  The next time she were to encounter a poor, black American 
client, she would automatically recollect this schema.  That recollection might give rise to 
an expectation that this new client would lie.  If, however, t he student were to recognize 
that such an expectation might be generalized and generalized on too little information, 
then she might act differently toward this next client.  She might, for example, 
consciously remind herself that this is a different individual, she might remember the 
discussion we had about why the earlier client might have lied, and she might prepare a 
more nonjudgmental response should the current client lie.
IV.  Teaching Cultural Self-Awareness as Part of Multicultural Lawyering Training
An understanding of social and cognitive psychology can provide a foundation on 
which to develop cultural self- awareness, which is essential to multicultural 
competence.147  Cultural self-awareness enables the lawyer to understand that her culture
– including ingrained “beliefs, values, and attitudes”148 – shapes her unconscious 
assumptions and influences her interactions with people of different cultures.149 Through 
cultural self-awareness, a lawyer can develop an understanding of her own heritage, 
147
 Arredondo & Arciniega, supra note 16, at 266; Pedersen, supra note 16, at 203; and Wehrly, supra note 
22, at 48.  Bill Ong Hing has commented that recognizing how “personal identification differences,” such 
as class, race, ethnicity, gender, disability, and age, (all part of a student’s cultural self-awareness) affect 
lawyering seems common sensical but nonetheless requires training.  Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal 
Identification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in 
Lawyering Courses, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1808-10 (1993).
148
 APA Guidelines, supra note 16, at 23-24.
149 Id. at 23-25; and Wehrly, supra note 22, at 109-10.  
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which will “provide[ ] a firm base for understanding and respecting the world views of 
people with different  ethnic, cultural, and racial heritages.”150
To develop cultural self-awareness competency, a student must work through 
three domains:  attitudes and beliefs, knowledge, and behavioral skills.151 The 
framework presented below is not linear in nature but rather identifies issues that a 
student encounters as he acknowledges himself as a cultural being.  Permeating this 
framework is the premise that “unlearning racism [or oppression] is the first step a 
[lawyer] must take on the path of developing cultural awareness.”152  By oppression, I 
mean not prejudice, which is “negative attitudes, beliefs, and intentions,”153 but behavior 
that perpetuates social inequality.154 To perpetuate social inequality, the actor must have 
power, whether perceived or real.155  Power can come by virtue of membership in a 
150
 Wehrly, supra note 22, at 110.  The premise of cultural self-awareness is that appreciation of the 
significance of culture in one’s own life allows one to appreciate the significance of culture in another 
person’s life.  Thus, “It is not possible to be a competent counselor without being culturally competent.”  
Robert T. Carter, Becoming Racially and Culturally Competent:  The Racial-Cultural Counseling 
Laboratory, J. MULTICULTURAL COUNSELING AND DEV., at 20, 21 (2003).
151
 Robinson & Howard-Hamilton, supra note 56, at 272-73; and Sue & Sue, supra note 16, at 224-25.
152
 Lee, supra note 56, at 16.  Lee Anne Bell, Theoretical Foundations for Social Justice Education, in
TEACHING FOR DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE:  A SOURCEBOOK 3, 4 (Marianne Adams et al. eds. 1997)  
I substitute the term “oppression” for racism because my perspective on multicultural competence includes 
cultural differences other than those limited to racial and ethnic groups.  Use of the term oppression 
“emphasize[s] the pervasive nature of social inequality woven throughout social institutions as well as 
embedded within individual consciousness” and encompasses the problems of intersectionality of gender, 
class, etc.  Id. at 4-5.
153
 Ridley, supra note 39, at 17-18.  An example of racial prejudice is the “assumption that traits and 
abilities are determined biologically and one race is therefore inherently superior.”  Lee, supra note 56, at 
12.  A person might hold stereotyped images in her schema, but if she does not endorse the stereotype, then 
she is not exhibiting prejudice.  Taylor-Thompson, supra note 18, at 1291.
154
 Bell, supra note 152, at 5-6 (explaining that oppression manifests through different kinds of 
discrimination such as racism, sexism, classism, heterosexism, ageism, and ableism); see Ridley, supra 
note 39, at 17, 20-21 (advocating determination of racism from the consequences, not the causes, of the 
behavior).
155
 Ridley, supra note 39, at 21-22; Wehrly, supra note 22, at 167-68.  Unfortunately, the presence of power 
also makes developing multicultural competence more difficult.  The “persistent nature of [cultural] 
stereotypes and misinformation and a keen desire to preserve in-group status” make the powerholder more 
resistant to exploring social inequality and acknowledging her own role in maintaining that inequality.  
Hartley & Petrucci, supra note 10, at 165.
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cultural group.  In a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer holds power by virtue of her 
role and cultural dynamics.156
This distinction between intentions and effects is crucial to developing 
multicultural competency, as it enables the lawyer to focus on behavior (hence the third 
domain), which is easier to change than the underlying, automatic assumptions ingrained 
in our schema157 and to work through the defensiveness that can accompany discussions 
of oppression, both historical and contemporary.
First, the student ponders her own attitudes and beliefs:  Does she recognize that 
she has a culture?158 Does she believe that cultural self-awareness is important?  Is she 
aware of how her culture shapes her attitudes, values, biases, and assumptions about 
lawyering?  Does she recognize the limits of her own multicultural competency?  What 
makes her comfortable or uncomfortable working with cultural similarity and 
difference?159 This domain is probably the most difficult for law students to develop, as 
law students tend to favor reason over emotions.160  In addition, society and legal training 
acculturate students into blindness toward cultural differences and the privileges that can 
accompany group membership.161  However, examination of one’s attitudes and beliefs –
156
 Wehrly, supra note 22, at 168.
157
 Ridley, supra note 22, at 24-25.
158
 Members of the dominant white American culture may not recognize that such a culture exists.   In 
many instances, “Whites do not see themselves as White.  Often, American or human being is used as a 
descriptor.”  Robinson & Howard-Hamilton, supra note 56, at 278 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).  
De-racializing the culture can occur because “Whites in the United States learn that they are entitled to 
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and the emotions that examination can arouse – can pay dividends for client interaction 
by helping the lawyer to develop empathy for clients, which in turn can enhance rapport 
and information gathering,162 to understand client goals and interests, and to provide 
more comprehensive representation.
Students from the dominant culture may not recognize that they have a culture.  
For example, during a discussion on culture, a white male student told me that he did not 
think he had a culture as a white male.  When I asked, he identified sources of values, 
attitudes, and beliefs (his family, his geographic base, and schools he had attended) but 
did not think that they added up to a unitary, coherent culture.  I asked then about people 
whom he thought have such a culture.  As the student hails from Texas, he named 
Mexican immigrants.  We then considered how someone from Mexico might respond if 
asked to identify her culture, first while in Mexico and then again when transplanted to 
the United States.  We also considered why another person might identify the 
immigrant’s culture as Mexican.  The student then realized that awareness  of culture is 
easier when one stands outside the dominant culture.  Indeed, the student did not consider 
himself to be a Texan culturally, as he is not a cowboy or rancher and had been more 
interested in education than his peers.  Rather, he feels comfortable in Boston even 
though he often is perceived as a Texan in Boston.  Thus, the student recognized, first, 
that, even though he perceives nuance and differentiation in his own world view and its 
that dissonance by denying their participation in racism).  Indeed, legal education long has ignored the 
effects of race and culture on the lawyer-client relationship, preferring instead to consider race and culture 
as a strategic tool, to be used, for example, in jury selection, Hartley & Petrucci, supra note 10, at 165, or 
developing a narrative to appeal to the fact-finder, Krieger & Neumann, supra note 18, at 158 (awareness 
of the likely schema of one’s audience helps the lawyer to shape his/her narrative).
162 See Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, When Students Lose Perspective:  Clinical Supervision 
and the Management of Empathy, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 135, 136 (2002)  (explaining that empathy helps 
information gathering because “the lawyer is called upon to feel as the other does not only to solicit 
information but also to understand more fully the import of the speaker’s words”).
38
development, those nuances and differences might not be visible to others, and, second, 
that his world view is recognizable as a culture to others and therefore ultimately to 
himself.
Second, the student consciously considers specific knowledge.  The focus on 
specific knowledge – which can be drawn from fieldwork, personal experience, 
simulations, readings, etc. – leads to processing the information gleaned163 and then to the 
formulation of abstract concepts and generalizations that will assist the students in new 
situations. 164  Some examples of the different kinds of knowledge to study follow:
• With regard to her own culture, she might consider how the media portrays 
homeless people, alcoholics, women, the elderly, and others she is more likely to 
encounter as clients in the clinic.  
• With regard to “how oppression, racism, discrimination, and stereotyping are 
perceived”165 by members of different cultures, she might consider reports 
indicating the different perceptions of the prevalence of discrimination in the 
United States by members of different racial groups.  
• With regard to her own style of lawyering, she might recognize that it is 
“culturally learned and culturally specific,”166 with its own impact on her clients 
and others.167 For example, she might consider how a preference for 
chronological story telling may clash with another culture’s preference for 
163
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narrative or how her office’s policy of scheduling interviews during 9-to-5 
business hours affects poorer clients who are hourly wage earners.  
Another way to explore this domain more comprehensively is to start with 
personal experience, looking for patterns of behavior or of client reactions and then to 
trace the patterns to their cultural sources.  For example, I consider my own experience at 
a workshop on cross-cultural supervision.  We engaged in an exercise in which each 
attendee listed a number of supervisees with whom each had a good relationship and 
supervisees with whom each had a challenging relationship.  The trainees then considered 
each category of supervisees for patterns.  As I considered my lists, I realized that I most 
frequently had difficulty supervising white male students.  The specific difficulties varied 
from student to student, and I could recall very good relationships with white male 
students, but the pattern was clear:  my most difficult supervisory relationships were with 
white men.
This pattern led me to consider first what in my experience made it harder for me 
to work with white men.  Looking first at my family of origin, I realized that its 
Confucian -based culture that inculcated deference to men as authority figures might 
make it harder for me to assert my own authority.  Moving beyond my family, I further 
realized that, as a group (Taiwanese Americans), we all further deferred to white men in 
particular as powerholders, and that this experience might cause additional interference
with the exercise of authority.  Indeed, I then recalled an incident in which a white male 
student asked me on the first day of a legal research and writing class for all the writing 
assignments upfront as he did not need to attend class because he had won awards for 
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legal writing.168  Because of that incident, might I be hesitant to supervise?  Or too 
aggressive in supervision in an effort to preempt anticipated insubordination?  I also 
considered my views toward white law students in particular.  When a white male student 
demonstrated poorer analytical or writing skills, was I guilty of holding him to a higher 
standard because of an assumption that white students overall have better analytical and 
writing skills than students of color at the school?  
I also reviewed aspects of white American male culture that might affect the 
students’ interaction with me.  When I raised concerns with empathy in a white male 
student’s interaction with a client, did he dismiss these concerns as “touchy feely” 
because I am a woman?  Was a student resentful of the emphasis on client interaction 
skills when previously he had earned praise for his classroom work?  Were stereotypes 
about Asian women (usually not authority figures, litigators, or law professors) and
assumptions about age and experience (yes, I look younger than I really am, and I am the 
youngest and most junior supervisor in my clinic program) affecting their reception of 
my supervision? 
Armed with these considerations, I can reevaluate my approach to supervision 
generally and to white male students specifically in ways that take into account my 
culture, their culture, and the interaction of the two.  Possibilities include:  are my 
automatic lawyering expectations of white male students unfair?  Am I transferring prior 
bad experiences with white men on them?  Do I need to develop more comfort and 
confidence in my own authority?  Do I need to be more explicit, with examples, of my
expectations and of their expectations?  Do I ask about concerns with our multicultural 
supervision?
168
 Of course, I denied his request.
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Third and finally, building on her knowledge, the student acquires skills that 
enhance her multicultural competence and seeks out opportunities to practice them.  The
skills help her to continue the process of understanding herself as a cultural being, 
limitations and all, and to develop a nonracist identity.169 As noted above, discrimination 
typically occurs through the consequences of behavior, not through the intentions of the 
actor.  Thus, by identifying specific behaviors that might be oppressive and 
nonoppressive, a lawyer can reinforce nonoppressive behaviors and fair practices.170
Bryant and Koh-Peter’s Five Habits and Tremblay’s heuristics can be valuable here to 
help students anticipate cultural differences and to acquire good behaviors, which can be 
reinforced and replicated through simulations, classroom discussion, supervision and 
fieldwork.171 And when missteps occur, Krieger and Neumann’s reminder to apologize 
promptly can help to repair damage to a relationship and perhaps lead to better 
information on how to adjust one’s behavior in the future.
V.  Conclusion
As a legal services attorney, I have attended numerous diversity training
programs.172 In retrospect, the superficiality of most programs is reminiscent of the
reasoning of the Grutter opinion, being perfunctory nods to the market reality that legal 
services clients are frequently more diverse than the service providers.  As a result, most 
programs fell short, being one-time, three-hour workshops in which the attendees 
169
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mouthed platitudes about diversity, looked bored, and sometimes participated in an 
exercise, usually to identify individual cultural group memberships.  There was often 
little explanation of the purpose of the exercise, little time for reflection and processing, 
and no specifics as to cultural knowledge or skills to develop.173 Nor was their discussion 
about implicit discrimination, that gap between good intentions and discriminatory 
outcomes.  Because the goal of the training was superficial (better service provision to 
clients who are different) there was no discussion of what multicultural competence 
should entail affectively, cognitively, or behaviorally.
These experiences lead me to suggest some changes to diversity training for 
lawyers and law students.  The training should not be about learning racial etiquette in a 
diverse economy but about learning multicultural competence with the explicit goal of 
empowering culturally different clients (and colleagues) as part of a larger effort to end 
discrimination.  Being explicit about the goal174 would allow a clearer, more realistic 
framework for understanding the never-ending progression toward multicultural 
competence and a basis for questioning and challenging the techniques and experiences 
we encounter on that journey.  As the framework is based on psychosocial concepts that
173
 Pedersen identifies three ways in which multicultural competency training can fail:  (1) an exclusive 
focus on awareness of one’s own cultural biases and prejudices, without training on what to do with this 
awareness; (2) an overemphasis on acquiring knowledge of cultures without linkage to skills and behaviors; 
and (3) an overemphasis on skills, which can be applied in culturally inappropriate ways if not linked to 
awareness and knowledge.  PAUL PEDERSEN, A HANDBOOK FOR DEVELOPING MULTICULTURAL
AWARENESS 26 (2d ed. 1995).
174 Some educators advise us to give our students the theory up front because
theory enables us to think clearly about our intentions and the means we use to actualize 
them in the classroom.  It provides a framework for making choices about what we do 
and how, and for distinguishing among different approaches. . . . [A]t its best, theory also 
provides a framework for questioning and challenging our practices and creating new 
approaches as we encounter inevitable problems of cooptation, resistance, insufficient 
knowledge, and changing social conditions . . . .’”
Bell, supra note 152, at 4.
43
most lawyers are probably unfamiliar with, introductory training in these concepts also 
would be beneficial – especially in overcoming defensiveness and denial about a personal 
role in perpetuating discrimination and in developing greater consciousness of the 
societal and institutional structures that may make individual cultural differences more 
salient.
This article attempts to provide some of the concepts, theory, and framework 
underlying multicultural competence training for the purpose of social justice, as 
developed by mental health practitioners.175  By naming the goal – combating
discriminatory behavior by lawyer s – and laying bare the psychology that can cause us all 
unintentionally to discriminate against members of different cultural groups, I hope to 
engage law students and clinicians in a frank, structured, and ongoing journey toward 
multicultural competence.  
The focus here is on the first step of that journey – the development of a culturally 
self-aware lawyer who is conscious of her own biases and values without favoring them 
over another’s; aware of how his own values and biases affect clients from a different 
cultural group; comfortable with cultural difference; sensitive to circumstances that make 
it appropriate for a client to change lawyers; and aware of her attitudes, beliefs, and 
behaviors that may be oppressive.176  From this base, the lawyer can actively develop an 
understanding of her client’s culture and skills that will enable her to lawyer with 
multicultural competence.
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